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RECENT DECISIONS
the jury is presented.9 While, ordinarily, the answers to these ques-
tions would naturally fall within the province of the jury, and when
made in their verdict, would be regarded as binding, yet where the
facts are fairly incontrovertible, the question of proximate cause is
for the court.'0 In this regard, the question of proximate cause is
not different from the question of negligence, or contributory negli-
gence, in all of which, when the facts are conceded or found, the
question is one of law." The province of the jury is to find the
facts, but once being found or conceded, it is the duty of the court to
declare the law applicable to such facts.' 2
Therefore, in the present case, since the plaintiff failed to -show
a causal connection between the injury and the condition of the ves-
tibule, the only remaining conclusion was that the accident was caused
by plaintiff's own misstep and in such a case it is proper to take the
question out of the hands of the jury and direct a verdict for the
defendant.
J. J. L.
TREASURE-TRovE - LOST PROPERTY - MERGER OF TREASURE-
TROVE INTO LOST PROPERTY.-The defendants were members of a
church committee which had collected several bundles of rags. These
rags were parcelled out to hired women to weave into rugs. The
plaintiff was one of the women hired for this purpose, and in the
bundle allocated to her she found $2,100 in $10 and $20 bills. Plain-
tiff turned this money over to the defendants and advertised in the
local newspaper in an attempt to find the true owner. The money
was never claimed and the plaintiff requested the defendants to re-
turn it to her. Upon the defendant's refusal this action was brought
for the restoration of the money. The defendants counterclaimed
alleging that the plaintiff had forfeited her rights to the money by
failing to comply with a statute I that set up certain requirements 2
9 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Toops, 281 U. S. 351, 74 L. ed. 896 (1930) ;
Kalinowski v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, 242 App. Div. 43, 272 N Y. S. 759
(4th Dep't 1934).
10 Goodlander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Fed. 400 (C. C. A. 8th
1894).
1 Traylen v. Citraro, 112 Cal. App. 172, 297 Pac. 649 (1931).
12Johnson v. Wofford Oil Co., 42 Ga. App. 647, 157 S. E. 349 (1933).
' The Wisconsin statute provides: "If any person shall find any money
or goods of the value of three dollars or more and if the owner shall be un-
known, such person shall, within five days after finding money give notice
thereof in writing to the town clerk ... ." Wis. STAT. § 170.07 (1945).
2 The statute also provided a penalty for non-compliance: "If any finder
of lost money or goods of the value of three dollars or upward shall neglect
to give notice of same and otherwise to comply with the provisions of this
chapter he shall be liable for the full value of such money or goods, one-half
to use of town the other half to person who shall sue for the same ... .
Wis. STAT. § 170.07 (1945).
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as a prerequisite to a finder's rights to the property. Held, judgment
affirmed on the ground plaintiff was entitled to the money as treasure-
trove and therefore was under no compulsion to comply with the lost
property statute. Zech v. Accola et al., 253 Wis. 80, 33 N. W. 2d
232 (1948).
With the enactment of legislation in most jurisdictions,3 simi-
lar to the Wisconsin statute, the question of whether property found
shall be deemed lost property or treasure-trove has become a vital
one. The failure to comply with these lost property statutes often de-
prives the finder of his rights to the property; 4 and in some juris-
dictions a part of all property found enures to the municipality, city
or state even where there has been a strict compliance with the
statute.' To bring property found under the law of treasure-trove
it has to be gold or silver, coin, plate or bullion purposely concealed
for safe keeping,6 and this rule of law has been extended to include
their paper counterpart; 7 whereas lost property is defined as any
chattel that has been inadvertently or involuntarily parted with.8
This question has been complicated by some authorities advanc-
ing the view that this distinction no longer exists and the law of
treasure-trove has been merged into the law of lost property, 9 but
the better view seems to be that in the absence of a statute accom-
plishing this result no merger can be presumed, 10 for the common
law developed recognized distinctions which have not been overruled.
It has been held that the owner of land where treasure-trove is found
has no title in the treasure by virtue of his ownership of the land; 11
but the owner of land where lost property has been found was de-
clared to be the custodian of the property found for the true owner.12
The death of the true owner of treasure-trove gives no rights in the
treasure to his personal representative or heir; 13 yet the personal
representative of the owner of lost property has the same rights in
the lost property that he has in the decedent's estate.14
The court dismissed the defendants' argument that the statute
was broad enough to indicate an intent of the legislature to include
both lost property and treasure-trove stating that the court may not
so strain the words of the statute as to construe an intent that does
3 Garramone v. Simmons, 177 Misc. 330, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 465 (1941);
Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Ore. 108, 74 Pac. 913 (1904).
4 See note 2 supra.
5 See Note, 36 C. 3. S., Finding Lost Goods § 5 (1943).
6 Huthmacher v. Harris's Administrators, 38 Pa. 491, 80 Am. Dec. 502
(1861).
7 Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 71 Atl. 858 (1908).
8 Ibid.
9 Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Ore. 108, 74 Pac. 913 (1904).
10 Zornes v. Bowen, 223 Iowa 1141, 274 N. W. 877 (1937).
"I See note 7 supra.
12 McAvoy v. Medina, 11 Allen (93 Mass.) 548, 87 Am. Dec. 733 (1866).
13 Vickery v. Hardin, 77 Ind. App. 558, 133 N. E. 922 (1922).
14 Baugh v. Williams' Administrators, 264 Ky. 167, 94 S. W. 2d 330 (1936).
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not appear to have been within the contemplation of the legislature.
This holding appears to be sound for the Wisconsin statute does not
even intimate that its purpose was other than to regulate the rights
to that type of property deemed in law to be lost. Nor can there
be any doubt that this money was purposely concealed for safe-
keeping, or that the plaintiff has exercised complete good faith.
There is little direct authority on the question of merger of treasure-
trove into lost property, and generally it appears that the courts will
uphold the rights of persons who can bring themselves under the
established common law rule which distinguishes between treasure-
trove and lost property, when they have acted in good faith, for the
common law will not be lightly brushed aside by strained decisions or
subtle technicalities.
H. B. E.
VENDOR-PURCHASER-RESTRICTIVE, COVENANTS-MARKETABLE
TITLE-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-The vendor brought an action for
specific performance of a contract for the sale of property situated in
Asbury Park, N. J. The purchaser's defense was that the plaintiff
was unable to convey a marketable title because of a restrictive cove-
nant prohibiting the sale of liquor on the premises. The covenant
dated back to 1875 and all the property in the vicinity was burdened
with a similar provision by the common grantor. At the time of the
contract liquor had been sold openly at the plaintiff's hotel for many
years; also liquor was being sold by another hotel within one block,
by three others within two blocks and by eight others within three
blocks. Held, for the plaintiff. The "hazard of litigation" to which
a purchaser must not be subjected depends upon the chances of suc-
cessful attack as viewed by the court and does not include the remote
possibility of an idle suit. Casriel v. King, - N. J. Eq. -, 58 A.
2d 269 (1948).
The purchaser of real property has a right to a marketable title
which is reasonably safe against loss and attack.' "A marketable
title is one that is free from a reasonable doubt concerning title." 2
This requirement must be distinguished from the objection that as
a matter of fact, established by proofs, the vendor has no title at all,
an objection which may be raised by either party and which will as a
matter of law defeat an action of specific performance. In an action
of specific performance by the vendor if there arises reasonable doubt
concerning the title, the court without deciding the question regards
the doubt as sufficient reason for not compelling the buyer to take the
conveyance. 3 "... a purchaser is not to be compelled to take prop-
1 Barger v. Gery, 64 N. J. Eq. 263, 53 At. 483 (Ch. 1902).2 Vought v. Williams, 120 N. Y. 253, 24 N. E. 195 (1890).
3 POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE § 198 (3d ed. 1926).
